Abstract-Recently, several companies have introduced passive entry systems for automotive applications. These systems are intended to increase user comfort by eliminating the requirement that the user has to reach for the customer identification device (CID), a credit card like tool, to gain access to the vehicle compartment. While this extra level of comfort is a desirable feature, especially in luxury vehicles, it introduces several key attacks against the system. This paper describes several techniques of potential attacks against the passive entry system and proposes solutions to protect the vehicle from such attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
E ARLY keyless entry systems featured a numerical keypad located on the exterior of an automobile. The user was required to enter a unique digital code through the keypad to unlock or lock the vehicle. Since then, the use of keyless entry systems has grown rapidly, and the demand for a greater level of ease of use has increased. These demands led the automotive industry to introduce the remote keyless entry system (RKE) [1] - [4] .
The RKE system mainly consists of two units. The first unit, the customer identification device (CID), is a handheld device carried by the user; the second unit is a receiver located inside the vehicle. The communication between the vehicle and the CID is established via a radio frequency (RF) or an infrared (IR) link. Most of the current RKE systems are unidirectional in transmission: the transmission direction is from the CID to the vehicle. When a key is pressed on the CID, a special function code is transmitted to the receiver (vehicle) depending upon which key is pressed. The receiver, after receiving the function code, commands the hardware of the RKE system to take appropriate actions. Some of the remote access functions include vehicle locking, unlocking, remote engine start, and activation of the panic signal. Current market research shows an interest in long-range communication for certain functions, such as vehicle remote start. This demand has led to not only the development of a long-range RF link but also to a bidirectional communication link between the CID and the vehicle [5] .
The transmission direction from the vehicle to the CID is intended to carry information about vehicle status. This feature is necessary since it is not always possible for the user to ob- serve the vehicle response to his command without a feedback message from the vehicle that carries the vehicle status. Such long-range access can also allow the user to check the battery status in an electric vehicle. As the level of sophistication increases in the RKE system, additional features that increase user comfort and security become one of the most advertised selling features of a new vehicle. Even though the RKE system enhances user convenience, it still does not provide the full comfort level. The user still has to search for the CID and physically press a button to unlock the vehicle. To eliminate the users having to search for the CID, a passive keyless entry system was designed by Lectron. The system was installed in a 1993 Corvette [6] , [7] . It was designed based on a motion sensor that triggers the CID to transmit the authorization code to unlock the vehicle. But there were problems with the system, such as a high cost and low battery life due to the requirement of continuous transmission while the CID was in motion. With advancement of the technology, other techniques were investigated to enhance the initiation of the passive entry system [8] .
Though passive entry security systems provide more comfort to users than RKE systems, these systems are vulnerable to different kinds of attacks by intruders who have the capabilities and skills to build electronic devices to attack passive entry security systems [9] .
It is important at one point of the design to draw a line where the system reaches an acceptable level of security. At such a level, it will be more expensive for a thief to build a theft device than to throw a stone into the vehicle's window and steal the vehicle. For this reason, evaluating the level of attacks offered by a given design is an important factor in evaluating the overall security of the system and in meeting the design goals and tradeoffs.
The current passive keyless entry system is vulnerable to a well-known attack, called the two-thief attack or relay attack [1] , [10] . One solution for such an attack is presented in [1] , but there are some drawbacks to this solution. In this paper, we present a new solution for the two-thief attack. We then extend our work to provide solutions for more complicated attacks that can be initiated by three thieves. This paper is organized as follows. The communication mechanism between the vehicle and the CID is presented in Section II. An overview of different types of simple attacks is presented in Section III. Our solution to the widely known two-thief attack is presented in Section IV. A more complicated, but possible, attack involving three thieves is presented in Section V, and then a solution to this attack is also presented. The conclusion is presented in Section VI. The CID is a credit-card-like device that can be carried by a user in his wallet. The user has to have the CID in order to gain access to the vehicle. The vehicle is equipped with a loop antenna in each door handle. The operating range between the CID and the loop antenna is about 1 m. The vehicle uses a low-frequency (LF) magnetic field link to send a message to the CID. The CID responds using a radio-frequency (RF) link as shown in Fig. 1 . The LF link is used in order to have a better range control between the interior and exterior of the vehicle. This is due to the fact that the magnetic field generated by the LF coil decreases in strength with the cube of the distance [10] . This property of LF signals allows for a better coverage of the signals within the vehicle interior and also provides better control over the operating range of the signals outside the vehicle. The reasons for using an RF link from the CID to the vehicle are as follows.
a) An RF signal needs less power than an LF signal to transmit a message within the same range due to the fact that the strength of the signal decreases with the square of the distance as opposed to the cube of the distance for an LF signal. b) The CID runs from a small battery, so the use of an RF signal from the CID to the vehicle will increase the life of the CID battery. c) A high bit rate can be achieved if the messages are transmitted using RF signals as opposed to LF signals. d) Only one RF receiver is necessary inside the vehicle, as opposed to multiple LF receivers needed to cover the entire operating range of the system.
A. Triggering the Communication Between the Vehicle and the CID
The communication between the vehicle and the CID is started as soon as someone pulls a door handle of the vehicle. The vehicle starts the communication by transmitting an LF interrogation signal [8] . The LF signal enables all CID's within the operating range and wakes them up from a low power-consumption sleep mode. The LF signal contains data bits for security and ID. Once a CID wakes up from its sleep mode, it decodes the information received via the LF link. If the information is valid, then the CID responds with a security code via an RF link. All this bidirectional authentication process is going on while the user is pulling the door handle. If the control unit in the vehicle detects a valid code from the CID, it unlocks the door and allows the user to access the vehicle.
III. AN OVERVIEW OF SOME SIMPLE ATTACKS FOR PASSIVE ENTRY SYSTEMS
In this section, we described several simple attacks against the security of the passive keyless entry system. The well-known two-thief attack has also been described, and the existing solutions for this attack have also been presented and discussed. Some of the simple attacks are as follows. 
A. Message Playback Attack
When the owner is away from the vehicle, a thief can pull a door handle in order for the vehicle to start transmitting a message. The thief will then record the message transmitted from the vehicle. After that, the thief will stand next to the vehicle's owner, play back the message recorded from the vehicle, and wait for the CID to respond. The thief will then record the response from the CID, go back to the vehicle, and trigger the system again by pulling a door handle and play what the CID transmitted. To ensure the security and the integrity of the system against such attacks, a random challenge response method similar to the one used in the immobilizer technology is used [11] , [12] . A random challenge is generated from the vehicle every time it is triggered. A response to this challenge is required from the CID. If the vehicle receives the expected response for the challenge, then it unlocks the door and the user gains access to the vehicle. The challenge generated by the vehicle shall not be based on a simple random number-generating function that allows the attacker to forward predict the next challenge based on the previous hundreds or thousands of messages. This is simply because the thief can have all the time he needs to generate as many challenges as he likes just by pulling a door handle of the vehicle. If the thief could predict the next challenge, then he could generate it and play it next to the vehicle's owner who has the CID. The thief will then receive and record the response from the CID and play it near the vehicle for the vehicle to accept the CID's response and then unlock the door.
B. Dictionary Attack
In this attack, the thief builds an electronic dictionary. Each entry in the dictionary consists of a valid (challenge, response) pair. The thief can do that by generating a random challenge next to the vehicle's owner, who happens to carry the CID. The response from the CID is then captured and stored in the dictionary with the corresponding random challenge. Once the thief builds up the dictionary, he can go back to the vehicle and keep pulling a door handle hoping that the vehicle will generate a challenge that is already stored in the dictionary.
C. Cryptanalysis Attack
Cryptography is a wide subject that is outside the scope of this paper. We assume that the encryption algorithm used in the system provides enough security for any cryptanalysis attack against the system. For further information about cryptography and cryptanalysis, the readers are referred to [13] .
D. Two-Thief Attack
In this type of attack, two thieves attempt to bridge the gap (distance) between the vehicle and its owner in real-time, as shown in Fig. 2 . The thieves attack the system as follows. Each of the two thieves carries an electronic device to receive a signal from one side and send to the other side after amplifying the signal. Thief-1 stands next to the vehicle and Thief-2 stands next to the owner of the vehicle. Thief-1 first pulls a door handle of the vehicle for the vehicle to initiate communication. Thief-1 then receives the signal from the vehicle and sends it to Thief-2. Thief-2 receives the signal from Thief-1 and sends it to the owner of the vehicle. The CID of the owner responds after receiving the signal from Thief-2. Thief-2 receives the response from the CID and sends it to Thief-1. Thief-1 then receives the signal from Thief-2 and sends it to the vehicle. After that, the vehicle unlocks the door. Several techniques to protect the system from such an attack are suggested in [1] . These techniques are developed based on the following ideas.
1) Detection of a Repeater: All solutions in this category are based on the system's capability of detecting the presence of repeaters carried by the thieves in order to receive a signal from one side and then amplify and send it to the other side. The vehicle may detect the presence of repeaters between the vehicle and the CID by measuring how much time (loop time delay) is needed to receive a response from the CID after a message has been transmitted from the vehicle to the CID. If the amount of loop time delay is greater than a threshold value, then there are thieves in the loop who are receiving the signal from one side and sending it to the other side after amplification. Though measuring the loop time delay is the most reliable method for protecting the vehicle from such an attack, it requires a high-speed electronic device that might be very expensive for automotive applications.
2) Corrupting the Signal: In this category, the system is designed such that the communication links between the vehicle and the CID are corrupted if there are thieves in the loop who are amplifying the signal in order to send the signal from one side to the other. Here, two frequency tones are used with the signal [1] . When the thieves amplify the signal, some harmonics are generated that fall in the band of the two tones. As a result, the signal is corrupted. The paper of Schmitz et al. [1] is ambiguous and does not clearly explain the details of the solution. It also does not clarify whether the vehicle's receiver detects the harmonics to flag the presence of the thieves or the harmonics cause a corruption of the two tones transmitted. A drawback of such a solution is the assumption made in regard to the theft equipment concerning the amplifier stage. The paper assumes that the thieves are equipped with a low-end amplifier stage that will be driven into the saturation region to generate the in-band harmonics.
In Section IV of this paper, we present some improved solutions for the two-thief attack problem. Our solutions do not have the above drawbacks. 
IV. SOLUTIONS FOR TWO-THIEF ATTACK PROBLEMS
While maintaining the system security is a crucial part of the passive entry system design, the following key objectives have to be met for the passive entry system to be acceptable by the automotive industry.
a) The system is produced for the automotive industry at a high volume; thus a low cost design is very desirable. b) The system is intended to increase user comfort while maintaining or exceeding the safety and security levels of the currently used RKE systems. c) The system has to work reliably under various environmental conditions, such as variable temperature, acceptable noise interference, etc. The solutions that we present in this paper will satisfy the above key objectives. Before discussing any solutions, it is important to understand how the thieves may design and use their repeaters and how they may attack the passive entry security system. Fig. 3 shows the block diagram of a repeater that the thieves use.
A repeater consists mainly of two units and . Each unit has a transmitter and a receiver . The two units are physically apart from each other. Unit communicates with via an RF signal at carrier frequency , selected by the thieves.
modulates the input signal received through the receiver using a carrier frequency . The modulated signal is then sent to unit .
demodulates the signal to reconstruct the original input signal IN and sends that output using transmitter . Ideally, the output signal OUT is equal to the input signal IN with some delay. To bridge the signals from the vehicle to the CID and vice versa, two repeaters are required, as shown in Fig. 4 . The first repeater repeats the signal from the vehicle to the CID, and the second repeater repeats the signal from the CID to the vehicle. To avoid any interference between the two repeaters, the thieves can design their systems to communicate at different carrier frequencies and .
A. A Simple Attack by Two Thieves
In the current passive entry system, an LF link is used from the vehicle to the CID and an RF link is used from the CID to the vehicle. In the above figure, Repeater-1 will be used to the bridge the gap (distance) between the vehicle and the CID for the LF link, and Repeater-2 will be used to bridge the gap for the RF link from the CID to the vehicle. The thieves use two different carrier frequencies and to avoid interference among the signals in the link between the two thieves. Since the The protocol is initiated first by sending an LF signal from the vehicle to CID when a door handle is pulled. The LF signal is used for two purposes: 1) it provides better control over the communication range and 2) it provides a wakeup mechanism for the CID from a battery-saving mode. Some other system design specifications also require the LF supporting hardware to be there for batteryless backup mode. The interesting part is in the RF communication. One of the key design requirements is to have the CID and the vehicle to communicate at the same frequency. This means that the RF link from the CID to the vehicle will use the same frequency as that of the RF link from the vehicle to the CID. After the LF signal has been sent by the vehicle, the vehicle then sends an RF1 packet that might contain some identification and challenge code. The CID then responds by sending an RF2 packet. Note that both RF1 and RF2 packets are transmitted using the same frequency. Now let us try to understand how the system is going to be protected against the attack by two thieves. We can assume that a thief does not know the exact format of the communication protocol unless the thief has vast knowledge about the communication mechanism and spent some time in studying the communication timing of the signals between the vehicle and the CID. So the thieves do not know exactly what time the vehicle will be transmitting and what time the CID will be responding. Thus, the thieves will have to keep their repeaters on all the time. So, after a door handle of the vehicle is pulled by a thief, there is a continuous transmission among the vehicle, the two thieves, and the CID, as shown in Fig. 6 .
A third repeater, not shown in the figure for simplicity, is assumed to be in the loop to repeat the LF signal from the vehicle to the CID. The vehicle sends its RF packet using carrier frequency . Thief-1 first receives the vehicle's signal through his receiver. Thief-1 then modulates, amplifies, and sends the signal to Thief-2 using carrier frequency . Thief-2 then demodulates the signal and sends it to the CID using carrier frequency . However, the receiver of the second repeater of Thief-2 is on and listening at the same frequency. Thus, the receiver of the second repeater of Thief-2 will also receive the same signal that is being transmitted by his own transmitter of the first repeater. The transmitter of the second repeater of Thief-2 will then send the same signal, received from the vehicle, to Thief-1 via carrier frequency . Thief-1 will then demodulate and transmit this signal to the vehicle. Since the receiver of the first repeater of Thief-1 is also on all the time, the signal that is sent to the vehicle by the second repeater of Thief-1 will also be picked up by the receiver of the first repeater of Thief-1. As a result, a feedback occurs within the loop of Thief-1 and Thief-2. Since the vehicle is still sending an RF message to the CID, the feedback signal will get added with this RF message. As a result, the RF message from the vehicle to the CID will get distorted. After that, the CID will not be able to understand the message sent by the vehicle. Thus, the CID will not respond to this signal, and thereby Thief-1 will not be able to gain entry to the vehicle.
Two kinds of distortion may occur in the message. 1) Both the amplitude and the phase of the transmitted signal will have nonlinear distortions in the signal components due to the presence of feedback channel, as explained later. This nonlinear distortion will prevent the CID and the vehicle from understanding the communication signals.
2) The second kind of distortion will occur due to intersymbol interference. When the vehicle or the CID transmits a new symbol, at that time the signal for the previous symbol will still be in the loop due to the presence of positive feedback. Similar distortions may occur within the same symbol if encoding techniques like Manchester or pulse-width modulation are used. The presence of these types of distortions will also prevent the CID and the vehicle from understanding the communication signals. The bidirectional RF link that we used between the CID and the vehicle in order to come up with a solution for the simple attack by the two thieves also provides another advantage in terms of reducing the system authentication process. This is due to the ability of sending data at a higher bit rate via RF than LF. A higher bit rate means faster communication, and faster communication might lead to the elimination of some hardware that may be needed for fast and smooth operation. As a result, there will be a big savings in parts and labor.
2) Analysis of Feedback Signal: Fig. 7 shows the feedback loop between Thief-1 and Thief-2. The signal from the vehicle to Thief-1 is represented by , and the signal from Thief-2 to the CID is represented by . The time delay between Thief-1 and Thief-2 is . For simplicity of analysis, we assume that the time delay ( ) between the two thieves is identical in both directions. The time delay depends on the distance between the two thieves and the propagation delay through different components, such as filters, mixers, etc., of each repeater.
In time domain, the signals and are related as 
Hence, the transfer function of the feedback loop can be expressed as
The amplitude of the signal can be expressed as (4) and the phase of the signal can be expressed as
It is clear that the magnitude and phase characteristics of the feedback loop channel cause a nonlinear distortion for the different frequency components of the transmitted pulse. Such distortion is similar in nature to the distortion caused by multipath effect [14] . Different equalization techniques can be used to partly correct for such distortion [14] . However, these techniques have to be built in the vehicle and the CID receivers, something over which the thieves have no control. Thus, the above solution will protect the vehicle from the simple attack by two thieves.
B. A Complicated but Possible Attack by Two Thieves
Since the passive entry system design imposes requirements regarding the communication protocol as when each packet has to be sent and received once the system is triggered, the thieves' repeaters have to be designed to work with the timing imposed by the passive entry communication protocol in order for them to implement the attack.
If the thieves have any prior knowledge about the format and timing of the communication protocol, then after the communication is triggered by pulling a door handle of the vehicle, the thieves may know when the vehicle will be sending RF signals to the CID and when the CID will respond using RF signals. Then the thieves may design their repeaters in such a way that the repeaters will be automatically turned on and off depending upon the direction of the signal. This way, the thieves may avoid any feedback and interference in their signals. But designing such a system that will be automatically turned on and off will require very high-speed and complex electronic circuits. As a result, the repeaters may be too expensive to build. If such repeaters are built, then the thieves may be able to break the security. Keep in mind that in order to break the security by turning the repeaters on and off, the thieves must have prior knowledge about the format and timing of the communication protocol.
Solution Using a Secure Protocol: We have developed a secure protocol in order to protect the passive entry security system of the vehicle from the above type of attack. The idea behind developing this protocol is to avoid the thieves' knowing the exact timing and direction of the RF packets that will be sent from the vehicle to the CID and also from the CID to the vehicle, even though they could have been prior employees of the company that designed the passive entry security system. The communication protocol is triggered when the vehicle's door handle is pulled. This will initiate the LF signal to wake up the CID. The LF packet also establishes a time reference for the RF communication to come. If multichannel is supported in the communication protocol, the LF signal could contain some additional information such as the RF communication channel number. It could also contain some wakeup patterns to reduce system interference from other sources. The LF packet will then be followed by three RF packets, as shown in Fig. 8 .
These RF packets are summarized as follows. The contents of RF1 packets are encrypted data that carry information regarding the transmission direction of the data bits in the second packet (RF2). The contents of RF1 packets change every time the system is activated. Since the contents of RF1 packets are encrypted, and a different encryption key is used for different vehicle/CID pairs, there is no way the thieves can know what the contents of the RF1 packet will be when a door handle of the vehicle is pulled. Note that even if the thieves were employees of the company that designed the passive entry security system, they will not know what encryption key is used for which vehicle. Thus, they cannot read the contents of RF1 packets.
The RF2 packet consists of several minipackets. Each minipacket consists of data bits that are transmitted from either direction. The direction of each minipacket is defined and deduced from the decrypted information received from RF1 packet. The contents of the packets exchanged between the CID and the vehicle are used along with other encryption keys to build the RF3 response packet, as shown in Fig. 9 .
The RF3 packet concludes the protocol. It contains the CID's unique signature and response to the previous packets. The vehicle checks this packet and compares it to its precalculated response. If all match, the control unit authorizes access to the vehicle. Note that only the authorized CID has the identical encryption key used by the vehicle to build the proper RF3 response packet.
If the above secure protocol is used, then the thieves will not know the timing and direction of the RF packets. Thus, the thieves will have to keep their transmitters and receivers on all the time. If they do that, then there will be feedback in the communication channel between the vehicle and CID. As a result, the signal will be distorted and unreadable by the CID and vehicle.
The only way the thieves can break the passive entry security system is if somehow they can avoid feedback in the communication channel between the vehicle and the CID. In the next section of this paper, we describe another type of attack in which the thieves can break the feedback loop and thereby avoid feedback in the communication channel. However, to break the feedback loop, three thieves are necessary. Thus, we are calling this type of attack the three-thief attack. A solution for the three-thief attack is also presented in the next section
V. THREE-THIEF ATTACK AND ITS SOLUTION
The solution presented in Section IV will protect the vehicle against attack by two thieves. But three thieves can attack the security system of the vehicle by breaking the feedback loop that exists in the solution for the two-thief attack problem. If the feedback loop can be broken, then the signals will not become distorted. As a result, both the CID and the vehicle will be able to understand and validate the signals, and then the thieves will be able to access the vehicle.
A. Mechanism of the Three-Thief Attack
One thief, Thief-2, will stay close to the owner of the vehicle carrying the CID, and the other two thieves, Thief-1 and Thief-3, will stay close to the vehicle, as shown in Fig. 10 . Thief-1 will pull a door handle of the vehicle for the vehicle to initiate the communication. The vehicle will start transmitting using frequency . Thief-1 will receive the signal from the vehicle and then send it to Thief-2 using frequency . Thief-2 will send the signal to the CID using frequency . The CID will respond using frequency . Thief-2 will receive this signal from the CID and then send it to Thief-3 using frequency . Thief-3 will receive this signal from Thief-2 and then send it to the vehicle using frequency . The distance between Thief-1 and Thief-3 is far enough so that Thief-1's receiver cannot pick up the signal sent by Thief-3, but both of them are close enough to the vehicle so that the vehicle can pick up the signal sent by Thief-3 and Thief-1 can pick up the signal sent by the vehicle. The three thieves will be able to break the feedback loop due to the following two reasons.
1) The link between Thief-1 and Thief-2 uses a different frequency than the link between Thief-2 and Thief-3. Hence, when Thief-1 sends signals to Thief-2, Thief-3's receiver cannot pick up that signal. Similarly, when Thief-2 sends signals to Thief-3, Thief-1's receiver cannot pick up that signal either. 2) Thief-1 is far enough away from Thief-3. Hence, when Thief-3 sends signals to the vehicle, Thief-1's receiver cannot detect that signal. As a result, there is no feedback among the thieves. Hence, if the feedback loop is broken using the above mechanism, thesignalswillnotbedistortedand,asaresult,thethieveswillgain access to the vehicle.
B. A Proposed Solution
Here a solution is presented to protect the vehicle from the three-thief attack. This solution requires the CID to transmit its signals using two different power levels. Some bits will be transmitted at low power levels, and some other bits will be transmitted at high power levels. The vehicle, after receiving the signal from the CID, will check for the difference in power levels of the bits. If the power-level difference is the same as the expected difference and if all other authentication checks pass, then the vehicle will validate the signals received from the CID. So, the key technique behind this solution is to maintain the power-level difference in the signals from the CID to the vehicle. If the thieves try to break the feedback loop, then Thief-1 and Thief-3 must separate themselves by enough distance so that the high-power signal cannot go to Thief-1 from Thief-3. But if they separate themselves by that much distance, then at least one of them will be too far away from the vehicle. If Thief-3 is too far away from the vehicle, then the vehicle will not be ableto pick up the low-power signal from Thief-3. But if Thief-1 is too far away from the vehicle, then Thief-1 will not be able to receive the signals sent by the vehicle. As a result, the communication link between the vehicle and the CID will be broken, in which case the vehicle and the CID will not receive each others messages. Therefore, the thieves will not be able to gain access to the vehicle. The following analysis proves that if the thieves try to maintain thecommunication between the vehicle and the CID by keeping Thief-1 and Thief-3 closer to the vehicle, then there will be feedback in the signals; and if they try to avoid feedback in the signals by keeping Thief-1 and Thief-3 far enough away from each other, then either the vehicle will not receive all the signals from the CID via Thief-2 and Thief-3 or Thief-1 will not receive any signals from the vehicle. Thus, the thieves will not gain access to the vehicle.
C. Analysis
Let be the power transmitted by a transmitter and be the power received by a receiver. The received power in dbm is given by [15] , where dbm means decibel with respect to 1-mW power (6) where is the carrier frequency, is the distance between the transmitter and the receiver, and is the speed of light. For a given carrier frequency , the term 20 4 is a constant.
Let us assume that . The received power can then be expressed as (7) The following notations are used in our analysis.
Distance between Thief-3's RF transmitter and the vehicle's RF receiver. It is just small enough for the vehicle to receive the low-power signal transmitted by Thief-3. Distance between vehicle's RF transmitter and Thief-1's RF receiver. It is just large enough for Thief-1 not to receive the high-power signal transmitted by Thief-3, so that the feedback in the loop can be avoided. High-power level, in dbm, transmitted by the CID Low-power level, in dbm, transmitted by the CID. Note that the vehicle will also transmit all of its signals at this power level.
Received power level at the vehicle when the CID transmits high-power level . Received power level at the vehicle when the CID transmits low-power level . High-power level, in dbm, transmitted by Thief-3. Low-power level, in dbm, transmitted by Thief-3. The power level, in dbm, at which Thief-1 receives the high-power signal transmitted by Thief-3. Sensitivity, in dbm, of the receivers of the CID and vehicle. This means that the signals, when they arrive at the receivers of the CID or vehicle, must have at least this much power for them to be detected by the CID or vehicle. Sensitivity, in dbm, of Thief-1's receiver. Note that and need not be the same, because the thieves can design their hardware to have different sensitivity. Difference in transmitted power levels, in dbm, from the CID. Range of vehicle's as well as CID's signals. This means that when the thieves are not in the loop, the CID must be within a distance of from the vehicle's transceiver for the vehicle and CID to exchange messages. Thief-1 must be within a distance of from the vehicle's transceiver for Thief-1 to detect the signals transmitted by the vehicle. Note that and need not be the same, because may not be the same as . If Thief-1 uses a very high-sensitivity receiver, then will be greater than . On the other hand, if the sensitivity of Thief-1's receiver is very low, then will be less than .
Let the CID be at a distance from the vehicle, where . Using (7), we can express and as (8a) (8b) Equations (8a) and (8b) imply that (9) Hence, the difference between the received power levels, in dbm, is the same as the difference between the transmitted power levels. The power-level difference of the CID's transmitted signals is a known parameter to the vehicle. Thus, after receiving signals from the CID, the vehicle will measure the power-level difference of the signals. If this difference is not equal to the expected value, then the vehicle will not validate the signals even if all other authentication checks are valid. The RF transmitter and receiver of the vehicle are located at the same place inside the vehicle. The manufacturer of the vehicle can select an appropriate location inside the vehicle where the RF transmitter and receiver can be installed. The thieves do not have any control over this location. However, the thieves can control the values of and , shown in Fig. 11 , by adjusting the gain of Thief-3's hardware and the sensitivity of Thief-1's receiver.
When the CID is within a distance of from the vehicle, the vehicle's receiver must be able to detect the low-power signal transmitted by the CID. Hence, using (7), we get (10) When Thief-3 is within a distance of from the vehicle, the vehicle's receiver must be able to detect the low-power signal transmitted by Thief-3. Hence, using (7), we get (11) From (10) and (11), we get (12) When Thief-1 is within a distance of from the vehicle, Thief-1's receiver must be able to detect the signals transmitted by the vehicle. Hence (13) Since is large enough for Thief-1 not to detect the high-power signal transmitted by Thief-3, we can write , where the value of is (14) Now using (13) and (14) and the relation , we obtain i.e., i.e.,
Note that
Using (12), we can write the above expression as i.e., i.e., If the thieves can satisfy the above expression, then there will be no feedback in the loop. Thus, if the thieves can satisfy the above expression without breaking the communication link between the CID and vehicle, then they will be able to get into the vehicle. Now we are going to show that the thieves will not be able to satisfy the above expression if we appropriately select a value of . For the communication link between the CID and the vehicle not to be broken by the thieves, Thief-1 must be within a distance of from the vehicle. Hence, , and the maximum value of . Thus, the thieves need to satisfy the following condition:
The value of the parameter is determined by the manufacturer of the vehicle security system. The thieves have no control over the value of this parameter. A typical value, possibly the maximum value, of can be 2 m. This means that, when the thieves are not in the loop, the CID must be within a range of 2 m from the vehicle's transceiver for the CID and vehicle to receive each others signals. A value of more than 2 m for does not make any sense, because when the owner with the CID will pull the door handle of the vehicle, the CID will not be more than 2 m away from the vehicle's transceiver.
The thieves have control over the parameters and . Hence, for a given value of , the thieves will try to satisfy the above expression by selecting the minimum values of and . The minimum value of as well as is the distance between the vehicle's transceiver and the vehicle's exterior side. If the vehicle's transceiver is located halfway between the doors of the two sides of the vehicle, then the minimum value of and cannot be less than 0.5 m. So, if m and m, then the above expression becomes i.e., dbm
Hence, if the difference between the two transmitted power levels from the CID is higher than 18.062 dbm, the thieves will not be able to get into the vehicle.
In the above solution for the three-thief attack problem, we assumed that two thieves will be standing near the vehicle and one thief will be standing near the CID. The thieves can also break the feedback loop by keeping Thief-2 and Thief-3 near the CID and Thief-1 near the vehicle. Thief-1 will initiate the communication by pulling a door handle. Thief-1 will receive a signal from the vehicle and send it to Thief-2. Thief-2 will then send the signal to the CID. Thief-3 will collect the response from the CID and send it to Thief-1. Thief-1 will then send the response to the vehicle. To break the feedback loop, Thief-2 and Thief-3 must be far enough from each other so that Thief-3 does not pick up the signal sent by Thief-2. Also, they must be close enough to the CID so that the CID can pick up Thief-2's signal and Thief-3 can pick up the response from the CID. In this case, the vehicle has to send the signals using two different power levels. However, this type of attack using two thieves near the CID and one thief near the vehicle is not that realistic, because if the two thieves try to do something in order to manipulate the distance among the owner of the vehicle and themselves, then the owner may become suspicious about the thieves' activities.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The demand for passive entry security systems is growing due to the fact that they provide additional comfort and convenience over the remote keyless entry systems. However, the use of passive entry security systems is vulnerable to different types of attacks by two or more thieves. The current solution to the two-thief attack problem, available in the literature, has some drawbacks. We presented some new solutions for the two-thief attack problem. We then described another possible attack by three thieves. We also presented a solution for this type of attack problem. Our solutions can be easily implemented in electronics without requiring any complex electronic circuits. Thus, we believe that we have provided cost-effective solutions to protect the passive entry security systems from different types of attacks by two or more thieves.
